Following devolution in 1999 to the Scottish Parliament, and Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland, the four UK countries offer a fascinating natural experiment to test the outcome of applying two different policy paradigms: the traditional 'knightly' policy paradigm, 1 which is perceived to reward failure, in the National Health Service (NHS) on a small scale in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; and the policy paradigm of provider challenge, which is perceived to reward success and penalize failure, on a massive scale in the NHS in England.
The devolution settlement in the UK shows four marked differences from normal federal governance. First, it is political not fiscal: the UK taxpayer funds the NHS in each country, yet only the English NHS is held to account for its performance by targets set by the UK Treasury. Second, there is no elected body for England, so English political accountability for its NHS is exercised through general elections to the UK Parliament in which Members of Parliament from the other three countries vote, sometimes decisively, on legislation that applies to England only. Third, there is no basis for agreeing what should be the UK-wide elements of policy for devolved services. Fourth, one country dwarfs the others in scale: England, in terms of its population (50 million), is ten to thirty times larger than the other three countries. 2 The traditional post-Second World War policy paradigm that applied to public services throughout the UK has been described by two policy advisers to former Prime Minister Tony Blair as one that assumed 'knightly' behaviour by health care providers 1 and that 'health professionals want to, and generally will, "do the right thing" if properly funded and accorded freedom from external interference'. 3 A corollary of this paradigm is a system of perverse incentives that reward failure with extra resources: how could 'knights' be blamed for failures? In the 1990s, this paradigm was abandoned for schools in England and Wales: publication of league tables of examination performance named and shamed failing schools. 1 A series of scandals involving doctors 4 and perceived underfunding contributed to a perceived crisis in the NHS in the winter of 1999/2000. In January 2000, following a television interview, the Prime Minister committed the UK government to sustained and unprecedented annual increases in NHS funding with annual growth in real terms of about 5% a year from 2001/2002 to 2006/2007. 5 Only in England, however, was the shift to munificence in funding accompanied by a paradigm shift: from policies that assumed knightly behaviour by health professionals to policies that created constructive discomfort for producers by penalizing success and rewarding failure. 3 Across all public services in England, a new Prime Minister's Delivery Unit oversaw transformation in performance of a select set of services (health care, schools, police and justice, roads and trains) against demanding targets and challenged provider capture of government departments. 6 For example, the waiting time from a GP referral to an elective admission (including diagnostic tests) could take over two years in 2001, but from 2008 this had been reduced to less than 18 weeks.
In 2000, the government announced a new regime of performance management for the English NHS that would reward success, through earned autonomy, and report performance in a way that inflicted public reputational damage: by naming and shaming organizations that failed to achieve national targets. This was accomplished using Star Ratings from 2001 to 2005 and an annual Health Check for providers from 2006. 2, 7, 8 Although the UK government argued, in 2000, that this would be a more powerful way of driving improvement than provider competition, which had been tried in the internal market between 1991 and 1997, by 2002 the government began to reintroduce an internal market into the English NHS. 3 In contrast, after devolution, the governments in Scotland and Wales stopped publication of school league tables, did not report failure to achieve targets in their NHS in a way that would inflict public reputational damage on 'failing' organizations, and sought improvement through integration instead of provider competition. The latter was attempted by abolishing the division between purchasers and providers, with organizations again responsible for meeting needs of populations as well as running services in their defined areas, as in the pre-1991 model of the NHS. 2 Because of political and security problems, in Northern Ireland, devolution has had minimal impact on the development of new policies. 2 The governments of each country have, however, pursued similar policy objectives in their NHSs, including reducing long waiting times for hospital care and diagnosis, 2 achieving a rapid response by ambulances to what may be life-threatening emergency calls 8 and improving health outcomes. 2 Hence the four UK countries offer a fascinating natural experiment.
A new study 2 reports on this natural experiment for the four NHSs by looking at: life expectancy, expenditure, staffing levels, hospital activity, crude productivity, rates of various medical procedures, waiting times and ambulance response times. The study extends a previous longitudinal analysis 9 through comparisons of a set of indicators consistent for 1996/1997 (before devolution), and 2002/2003 and 2006/2007 (after devolution). In addition, for 2006/2007, it presents a novel cross-sectional analysis that compares the English regions with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It showed that the national averages of crude productivity of NHS staff for England were distorted by the unrepresentative nature of London. Hence the north east region of England, which is similar to the other three countries in terms of population size and socioeconomic, demographic and morbidity characteristics, was identified as a more appropriate comparator of performance than England as a whole.
As the data stopped at 2006/2007, they offer a basis for evaluation of differences in management of performance around targets given that the new internal market would have had little impact by that time. The report adds to other evidence that the shift in England, from the traditional 'knightly' policy paradigm to provider challenge through a regime that inflicted public reputational damage on organizations that failed to achieve national targets, worked. The NHS in England, with the lowest levels per capita of funding and hospital staffing, had markedly superior performance than the NHSs in the three other countries in terms of hospital waiting times and ambulance response times than the other three countries. 7 -11 The crude productivity of hospital doctors and nurses in the north east region was higher than in the other three countries and, strikingly, they treated on average about twice as many patients as hospital doctors and nurses in Scotland. Since the report was published, however, the reliability of the official statistics for Scotland has been queried. Studies to date have failed to find any evidence that the NHS in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland performs better than England on any other criteria. 10 -12 This suggests that the smaller countries in the UK, which are reluctant to abandon the knightly policy paradigm are more vulnerable to provider capture. It also raises the question as to whether or not this is due to the peculiar nature of devolution in the UK. Outside the UK, are smaller countries or regions with greater autonomy also more vulnerable to provider capture? The continuing natural experiment in the UK merits further analysis, including exploration of the impact of the reintroduced of an internal market in the NHS in England versus the more integrated NHSs elsewhere in the UK.
